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PHILIP R. WANDSCHNEIDER*

Managing River Systems:
Centralization Versus
Decentralization"
INTRODUCTION

Recently water resource decisionmaking in the Pacific Northwest has
taken one step towards centralization and one step away from centrali-

zation. In a move towards centralizing authority, Congress created a
regional council with significant powers over hydropower and fish and

wildlife uses of the Columbia River.' Nearly simultaneously the regional,
federal-state, water resource planning commission was disbanded by ex-

ecutive order.2 One might question which, if either, of these institutional
changes represents an improvement in river basin management. The pur-

pose of this paper is to investigate whether there is some basis for believing
that either more centralized or more decentralized organizational forms
inherently lead to superior river basin management.
Institutional change is complex, involving many factors besides the

centralization-decentralization question. Still one must partition the large
question of institutional design some way. This article focuses on whether
authority should be concentrated in relatively few hands or dispersed

among a large number of parties. The extreme form of centralization is
autocracy or dictatorship; the extreme form of decentralization, anarchy.
This paper examines less extreme, but quite distinct, organizational approaches.

The paper has two major analytic parts. The first part examines whether
there exists some general, a priori, argument for either centralization or
decentralization of water resource management, concluding that, although
*Assistant Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics, Washington State University.
"his work is the result of research sponsored in part by NOAA Office of Sea Grant, U.S.
Department of Commerce, under grant number NA81AAD-D0086 (project number R/WSU-3). The
U.S. government is authorized to produce and distribute reprints for governmental purposes notwithstanding any copyright notations that may appear hereon. I am indebted to Paul Barkley, Ron
Faas, and A. Allan Schmid for useful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
1. The Northwest Power Planning Council created by the Pacific Northwest Electric Power
Planning and Conservation Act of 1980. 16 U.S.C. § 839 (1982).
2. The Pacific Northwest River Basins Commission was one of several multistate regional commissions created by executive order pursuant to the Water Resources Planning Act of 1965. 42
U.S.C. § 1962b (1982). The Act also provided for the establishment of the national Water Resources
Council (also now defunct). 42 U.S.C. § 1962a (1982).
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there are some general and a priori arguments, such arguments can be
mustered to support either position.
If general recommendations cannot be made (or lead to contradictions),
perhaps something can still be said about the consequences of choosing
between relatively centralized or decentralized schemes for river management. The second analytic section of the paper addresses this more
limited objective by focusing on two organizational problems: the management of externalities and the resolution of conflict. In both analytic
sections, the Columbia River management structure is used as a case
study. Therefore, to facilitate discussion, a short sketch of the institutions
of management for the Columbia River precedes the analysis.
THE COLUMBIA-SNAKE RIVER MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
The Columbia-Snake river system is one of the major river systems in
North America.' As the map shows, its drainage basin encompasses most
of three states, a major portion of another state, and a large part of the
province of British Columbia. Among the services its water provides are:
(1) production of three-quarters of the electricity consumed in the Pacific
Northwest; (2) irrigation of almost eight million acres of land; (3) habitat
for one of the world's largest anadromous fisheries (mostly salmon and
steelhead trout); (4) waterway for commerce 500 miles inland to Idaho;
and (5) numerous aesthetic and recreational values.4 The physical means
of control include over 50 major dams and 12 major storage projects.'
Approximately 40 percent of the mean natural flow can be stored.' Other
control structures include the pumps and canals of irrigation systems and
the locks which facilitate navigation.
Management of this huge, multiple use river system is extremely complicated. Authority is not concentrated in any single, or even dominant,
decisionmaker. To understand the management structure it is useful to
identify two decision levels. At the first level, policy and political decisions are made which establish a framework of working rules comprising
laws, regulations, contracts, and policies. 7 Given this framework, certain
3. The term Columbia River will hereinafter indicate the entire Columbia-Snake River system.
4. For an extensive discussion of resource availability, uses and needs, see 2 PACIFIC NORTHWEST RIVER BASINS COMMISSION, WATER, TODAY AND TOMORROW 3-36-3-51 (1979).
5. For comprehensive description of physical and institutional aspects of Columbia River management, see Department of the Interior, The Role of the Bonneville Power Administration in the
Pacific Northwest Power Supply System Including Its Participation in the Hydro-thermal Power
Program (1977) (Draft Environmental Impact Statement, DES No. 7721) [hereinafter cited as Draft
Role EIS].
6. Id. ch. 2, app. A, at 12.
7. See, P. Wandschneider, Control and Management of the Columbia-Snake River System (1984)
(Washington State University Agricultural Research Center Bulletin XB 0937). For additional discussions of Columbia River management, see generally, Draft Role EIS, supra note 5; K. Lee, D.
Klemka, & M. Marts, Electric Power and the Future of the Pacific Northwest (1980) (Washington
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actors carry on the day-to-day operational management of river control
and water diversion facilities. 8
A major feature of the framework of working rules which guides water
allocation in the West is that authority over water is shared by the state
and national governments. 9 States have the basic authority to allocate
water within their boundaries. 0 The states of the Pacific Northwest follow
the doctrine of prior appropriation in which individual water users obtain
access to water through state granted water permits." Once granted, such
water rights are real property which may be bought and sold.' 2 Thus states
control initial water allocation, but individual water users initiate water
permits, determine actual diversions, and negotiate subsequent water
transfers.
Federal water law is superior to, 3 but less comprehensive than, state
water law. There is no federal water code analogous to state water law.
Instead, there are relatively independent bodies of law chartering federal
water agencies, '"authorizing water development projects, '"and regulating
Water Research Center Report No. 38) [hereinafter cited as Lee]; Blumm, Hydropower v. Salmon:
The Struggle of the PacificNorthwest'sAnadromousFish Resourcesfor a Peaceful Coexistence with
the Federal Columbia River Power System, II ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 211 (1981);
and Hittle, Larson, Randall, & Michie, PacificNorthwest Power Generation,Multipurpose Use of
the Columbia River, and Regional Energy Legislation, 10 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.)
235 (1980).
8. The most comprehensive source on operational management of the Columbia River is again
the Draft Role EIS, supra note 5. See also Wandschneider, supra note 7; G. Flightner & G. Green,
Reservoir Control Center: Guidance Memorandum (January 1972) (available from the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division); Bonneville Power Administration, William A. Dittmer
Control Center. A Technical Description (June 1981); and Mittle, HydropowerSystem Planningand
Operationsand the Enfranchisementof Fish and Wildlife, 18 ANADROMOUS FISH L. MEMO I
(May 1982).
9. For a general discussion of the relative authority of the state and federal governments, see W.
Hutchins, Federal-StateRelations, in 3 WATER RIGHTS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES
(1977).
10. While federal water law is superior to state law, id., a series of laws in the late 1800s
recognized the basic authority of the state to allocate water [e.g., Act of July 26, 1866, 43 U.S.C.
§ 661 (1982)]. See also 1 W. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN
STATES 171-75 (1971). Congress also regularly includes saving clauses in water legislation which
state the intention of Congress not to modify state law. E.g., 16 U.S.C. § 839g(h) (1982). See also
United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978), and California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645
(1978) (confirming state rights to allocate water and condition federal water uses except when state
law is directly inconsistent with Congressional directives).
11. For a description of Western state water law, see generally W. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS
IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES (1977).
12. 1 id. at 437-589 (1971). Third parties, however, are generally protected by state law, and
rights may be forfeited due to non-use.
13. 1 id. at 103-04 (1971).
14. E.g., the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation chartered by Reclamation Law (the Reclamation Act
of 1902, Pub. L. No. 57-161, 36 Stat. 388, and subsequent amendments codified in scattered sections
of 43 U.S.C.).
15. E.g., the Columbia Basin Project Act, 16 U.S.C. § 835 (1982).
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certain water uses. 6 Federal law emphasizes instream uses such as navigation, water power, fish and wildlife, and water quality. 7 The federal
government, however, has been a major actor in irrigation through the
operations of the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. 8
The dispersion of authority over water between state and federal governments is extended by the myriad of state agencies, federal agencies,
and private parties, all with different roles and authority in water use and
management. In the Northwest these various agents tend to cluster together for water use decisions around particular water uses.' 9
Irrigation. Water use for irrigation is governed by state water law, °
state laws governing water companies and districts, 2' federal reclamation
law, 2 and various state and federal policies and laws designed to encourage irrigation investment. 23 Given the framework of appropriation
water law, the critical policy decision is the overall allocation of water
to irrigation. The primary determinent of this allocation is the decision
to invest in the infrastructure of dams, canals, pumps, etc., necessary to
deliver the water to the land. One can distinguish three investment decision processes in the Northwest, each involving a slightly different cast
of characters and set of rules: (1) U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (USBR)
projects; (2) private projects using federal land subsidies; and (3) commercial projects.2 4 For instance, USBR projects require Congressional
authorization, agency support, local support, and state government financial participation (in recent years), whereas commercial projects are
mainly the outcome of private decisions, given various state and federal
enticements.'
Hydropower, Flood Control, and Navigation. As elsewhere in the
United States, the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) has general authority
16. E.g., the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §401-467(e) (1982)
(regarding navigation); the Federal Power Act of 1920, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-823 (1982) (establishing
the Federal Power Commission subsequently renamed the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
which licenses non-federal hydropower projects); and the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1271 (1982) (establishing a system of streams which must be left in their natural state).
17. See supra notes 15 & 16.
18. For instance, 39% of the irrigated lands in the Pacific Northwest were USBR project lands
in 1980. Wandschneider, supra note 7, at 55.
19. R. Pealy, Improving Institutional Arrangements for Water Development in the State of Washington (June 1976) (Institute of Governmental Research, University of Washington, Project Completion Report No. A-057-WASH). See also Wandschneider, supra note 7, at 3.
20. See discussion supra note 10.
21. States generally create and govern local governments and regulate private, corporations.
22. See, e.g., Reclamation Act of 1902, Pub. L. No. 57-161, 36 Stat. 388 (codified in scattered

sections of 43 U.S.C.).
23. E.g., Desert Land Act of 1877, 43 U.S.C. 321-323 (1982) (providing cheap federal land to
individuals able to irrigate it).
24. Wandschneider, supra note 7, at 19-22.
25. Id.
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over flood control and navigation.26 Federal authority over hydropower
is exercised by the regulatory activities of the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) 27 and by the two federal water development agencies
active in the Northwest, the Corps and USBR. Two agencies are, however,
unique to the Northwest: the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) and
the Northwest Power Planning Council. BPA has no authority to own or
operate electric generators,2" but it does (1) market (nearly all) power
from the Corps and USBR;29 (2) market some power acquired from other
utilities;3" and (3) construct and operate a regional electricity grid. 3 BPA's
marketing and scheduling functions make it effectively the dominant
utility in the Northwest and a significant decisionmaker in streamflows.32
The other unique agency is the Pacific Northwest Electric Power and
Conservation Planning Council.33 The Power Planning Council has authority to establish a regional power plana4 which BPA, with some exceptions, must follow in acquiring power resources.3 5 The Power Planning
Council is unique because it is composed of appointees of the state
governors, but it has authority over federal agencies. 36 Finally, the Power
Planning Council also has some authority over fish and wildlife; it is
charged with producing a Fish and Wildlife Program intended to mitigate
past and future damages caused fish and wildlife by hydropower development.37 The program, and the Power Council itself, are financed by
BPA power revenues. 31
Fish, Wildlife and Environment. Fish and wildlife water use is an
area of interplay between state and federal authority. State agencies set
basic fish and game laws (inside three-mile limits) and operate hatcher26. Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §401 (1982); Flood Control Acts of 1936, 33
U.S.C. §§ 701a-701f, 701h (1982); Flood Control Act of 1944, ch. 665, §§ 1-8, 15, 58 Stat. 887
(codified at 16 U.S.C. §§460d, 825s; 33 U.S.C. §§701-1, 701a-1, 701b-l, 701c; 43 U.S.C. §390
(1982)).
27. 16 U.S.C. §§791-823 (1982).
28. See Bonneville Project Act of 1937, 16 U.S.C. § 832 (1982). See also Federal Columbia
River Transmission System Act of 1974, 16 U.S.C. § 838 (1982); Northwest Power Planning and
Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 839 (1982).
29. 16 U.S.C. § 838f (1982). See generally supra notes 5 & 7.
30. 16 U.S.C. § 838i (1982). For power acquisitions prior to the Northwest Power Planning Act,
see generally supra notes 5 & 7.
31. 16 U.S.C. §832a(b) (1982).
32. See infra note 55 and accompanying text. Note also that BPA is largely a wholesaler of power.
See, e.g., Wandschneider, supra note 7, at 25.
33. 16 U.S.C. § 839 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Power Planning Council].
34. Id. § 839b.
35. 16 U.S.C. § 838i (1982).
36. 16 U.S.C. §§ 839b, 838i (1982). See also Blumm & Johnson, Promisinga ProcessforParity:
The Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act and Anadromous Fish Production. 11 ENVTL. L. REP (ENVTL. L. INST.) 497 (1981).
37. 16 U.S.C. §839b (1982).
38. Id.
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ies.39 Federal agencies, however, finance most of the hatchery program"
and regulate harvesting beyond the three-mile limit.4'
The responsibility for fish habitat protection falls under an amalgam
of agencies and authorities: (1) state instream flow programs;42 (2) Indian
reserved water (fishing) rights; 43 (3) Indian treaty fishing rights;' (4)
FERC conditions on non-Federal dams; (5) federal agency multiple use
responsibilities per project authorizing legislation; and (6) federal law
such as the Endangered Species Act.45 Most recently the Power Council
has become an active participant in fish and wildlife management.46
At the operational level the process by which a given natural river flow
is controlled and used can be separated into three sets of decisions:47 (1)
decisions to withdraw water for consumptive uses; (2) decisions to regulate streamflow for non-power instream uses; and (3) decisions to regulate streamflow for hydropower production. A different, albeit overlapping,
group of actors is involved in each of these phases.
Decisions to withdraw water for consumptive uses, principally irrigation, are made by individual irrigators and other water users. 48 Withdrawal requires a valid water right, physical capacity and financial
feasibility.49 Thus, the independent decisions of literally thousands of
water users comprise the water withdrawal phase. There are some complications. In some cases water rights are held by groups such as irrigation
districts, ditch companies, or the United States Bureau of Reclamation. 0
Also, where water in a tributary is largely allocated, or rights are in doubt,
the courts and the state water agency oversee allocation.
The second decisional phase, non-hydro instream uses, includes fishery
habitat, flood control, navigation, and recreation. Two agencies have
mandates for general management regarding specific water uses; other39. See, e.g., Wandschneider, supra note 7, at 32-35.
40. The Mitchell Act of 1938, 16 U.S.C. § 755 (1982), is the major but not sole funding mechanism. BPA under the Northwest Power Planning Act also may fund hatcheries. 16 U.S.C. § 838i
(1982).
41. The (Magnusen) Fish Conservation Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. § 1801 (1982). Management is
actually in the hands of Fishery Management Councils which include state fishing agencies as well
as federal members.
42. See, e.g., Columbia River Instream Resources Protection Program, WASH. ADMIN. CODE
R. ch. 173-563 (1982). For fishery protection, see generally Blumm, supra note 7, at 262-300.
43. E.g., Colville Confederated Tribe v. Walton, 460 F. Supp. 1320 (1978), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981). Indian reserved water
rights include the right to instream habitat protection for fishery.
44. E.g., United States v. Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187 (W.D. Wash. 1980). See discussion,
infra notes 127-28.
45. 16 U.S.C. § 1531-43 (1982).
46. 16 U.S.C. § 839b (1982). See also discussion infra note 51.
47. Wandschneider, supra note 7, at 36-49.
48. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
49. See Wandschneider, supra note 7, at 36-38.
50. Id.
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wise management is at the discretion of individual project owners (of
dams and reservoirs) subject to the rules, regulations and contracts which
were briefly sketched above. One specialized agency is the recently established Water Budget Center." The major program of the Water Budget
Center is a water budget designed to increase juvenile anadromous fish
survival by increasing spring streamflow and thereby shortening the out
migration time of the fish. The second agency with a special mandate
is the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps). Congress has delegated it
general authority over nagivation and flood control on navigable rivers. 3
Control for instream uses normally takes the form of regulations or
operating limits governing reservoirs. The regulations specify reservoir
elevations and minimum flows, and restrict rates of changes in flows.
Once these regulations are set, management of river flows is essentially
turned over to hydropower operators who manipulate the storage facilities
to best meet their loads. In practice there is, of course, much dialogue
between the hydropower operators and other instream managers."
The hydropower operators comprise the utilities which own hydropower generators or own the capabilities of the generators by contract.
The largest utilty is the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) which
markets power from the Corps and U.S. Bureau of Reclamation projects.
A number of other private and public utilities own generators or their
power capabilities. 5 Virtually all the generating utilities cooperate to
56
produce an annual operating plan for the seasonal pattern of water use.
The utilities' general requirement is to shift streamflow from the natural
spring peak flows to winter when electricity demand is high for heating. 7
The annual plan specifies how each reservoir is to be operated to meet
the seasonal pattern of electricity demand. 8 Once the annual operating
plan is drafted, individual operators manage their facilities to meet their
own loads, subject to the annual plan, and other pooling and power
exchange agreements. 9
51. The Water Budget Center is operated by two managers, one representing Indian tribes, the
other various fishery agencies. The Center was established by the Fish and Wildlife Program adopted
pursuant to 16 U.S.C. §839b (1982).
52. Northwest Power Planning Council, Fish and Wildlife Program (1982). The replacement of
free flowing streams with pools and the storage of peak spring flows for winter hydropower use had
greatly increased the outmigration time for juvenile anadromous fish. Anadromous fish are those,
like salmon, that spawn in fresh water but mature in the ocean. See Blumm, supra note 7, at 214222.
53. 33 U.S.C. §§401, 701 (1982).
54. See Draft Role EIS, supra note 5; Wandschneider, supra note 7, at 39.
55. See, e.g., Wandschneider, supra note 7, at 23-24. See also, infra note 73.
56. Wandschneider, supra note 7, at 40-49.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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Summary
The above sketch depicts a decentralized management structure. The
final outcome in terms of river flow (allocation of water over time and
place) depends on numerous decisions made by a large number of actors.
Actors do vary enormously in their influence. Some have marginal influence,' while others, like the BPA and the Corps of Engineers, clearly
weigh heavily. Therefore, the organizational scheme of Columbia River
resource management is not analogous to the economists' ideal of decentralization: a perfectly competitive market in which each individual
actor cannot influence prices, but the aggregate choices of all actors
determine prices. The management structure, however, is clearly pluralistic when considered against the possibility of a central water manager.
SOME NOTES ON THE THEORY OF
DECENTRALIZED RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
Despite the undeniably decentralized organization of Columbia River
management, such decentralization is arguably inefficient and probably
unstable. Such an argument begins by examining the physical resource
itself.
River systems are characterized by a number of interdependencies and
other characteristics which imply market imperfections. 6 Examples include: (1) the indivisibility of large dam and storage projects; (2) the
hydrological interdependence (externalities) of upstream and downstream
storage units; and (3) the joint supply (non-rivalry) and non-exclusiveness
which almost all water uses exhibit to varying degrees.62
These market failure characteristics may have a number of consequences for river system management. Standard ("new") welfare
economics6 3 predicts that market failure characteristics will produce inefficiencies under a regime of competitive market production. 6' Welfare
economics suggests a number of remedies which might correct these
60. E.g., an individual irrigator, small utility, or individual Indian tribe.
61. For a review and critique of the market failure concept, see Randall, The Problem of Market
Failure, 23 NAT. RES. J. 131 (1983).
62. E.g., flood control by storage is provided in joint supply to all downstream residents, and
exclusion from benefits is very difficult.
63. Welfare economics is the study of the propositions by which economic alternatives may be
ranked and policies recommended. See, e.g., E. MISHAN, INTRODUCTION TO NORMATIVE
ECONOMICS (1982). Standard, or new, welfare economics adopts as its principal criterion the
Pareto Criterion. The Pareto Criterion states that an alternative, X, is better than another alternative,
Y, if at least one individual is better off in X, and none are made worse off. A Pareto Optimal or
efficient alternative is one for which there is not better alternative (in terms of the Pareto Criterion).
64. See, e.g., R. HAVEMAN, THE ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR (2d ed. 1976).
For more rigorous treatment, see A. M. FREEMAN, THE BENEFITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPROVEMENTS (1979); Y-K. NG, WELFARE ECONOMICS: INTRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF BASIC CONCEPTS (1980).
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inefficiencies. Most of these remedies involve merger of the affected
enterprises, government provision, government regulation, or tax and
subsidy schemes.6 Given the scope of interdependencies in river systems,
a general overall recommendation might be to install a single, merged
(centralized) management agency to internalize all the externalities.
A large private enterprise, created by merger, and a public agency,
empowered to produce "water services," seem at first to be equally
plausible solutions. Private entities might be subject, however, to the
problems of monopoly. Furthermore, since public enterprises have the
power of taxation, they can more easily finance the production of "public
goods." Finally, until recently the relative inefficiencies of a public enterprise were not considered by welfare economists. Government provision was usually assumed to have no administrative costs. 66 In summary,
the usual outcome of normative economic analysis of the characteristics
of a river system would produce a recommendation for central management by a public agency. The agency should be large enough to incorporate the relevant externalities and indivisibilities, which implies jurisdiction
over the entire river basin.
Before criticizing this recommendation, it might also be noted that
conventional wisdom in public administration reinforces this recommendation for central public management.67 The "reform tradition," which
has been the standard approach in public administration, emphasizes the
deficiencies of fragmented political systems.6 Fragmented systems suffer
from duplication (i.e., diseconomies of small size), lack of coordination
(externalities), lack of accountability, and amateur management due to
small size (diseconomies of size in use of human resources). Thus, the
recommendation of the conventional, "reform" tradition public administration would be for a central public management agency.69 The Tennessee Valley Authority and the proposed Columbia Valley Authority are
examples of such logic.7"
65. See MISHAN, supra note 63; FREEMAN, supra note 64; HAVEMAN, supra note 64. See
also H. GRAVELLE & R. REES, MICROECONOMICS, chs. 17 & 18 (1981).
66. See Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. ECON. I (1969).
67. Conventional wisdom is defined here as the Weber-Wilson (or reform tradition) approach.
E.g., Wilson, The Study ofAdministration, 12 POL. SCI. Q. 197 (1887). See, COMMITTEE FOR
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, RESHAPING GOVERNMENT IN METROPOLITAN AREAS
(1970). For summary of this approach, see also, R. BISH & V. OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING
URBAN GOVERNMENT (1973).
68. E.g., COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 67 at 36-38.
69. Id. at 19-20.
70. A large part of the arguments over such federally sponsored river management corporations
also concerned the private-public power debate. Concerning the proposed Columbia Valley Authority,
see G. NORWOOD, COLUMBIA RIVER POWER FOR THE PEOPLE: A HISTORY OF POLICIES
OF THE BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION 55-62 (1981); Blumm, The Northwest's
HydroelectricHeritage:Prologueto the PacificNorthwest ElectricPowerPlanningand Conservation
Act, 58 WASH. L. REV. 175, 195-97 (1983).
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Based on these two bodies of wisdom, one might expect that Columbia
River management would be highly inefficient and ineffective. Examintion of the facts reveals, however, that by some standards Columbia River
management is remarkably coherent and effective. Consider more specifically the potential sources of inefficiency in river system management,
and the manner in which Columbia River management deals with these
problems.
If the objective were to maximize hydropower production from the
Columbia River, the operations of the entire set of river storage and
generation facilities would have to be coordinated. Suppose, for instance,
that in response to its load (electricity demand) utility A releases water
from its storage facilities. Suppose the load of utility B, located down
stream, remains unchanged. Assume that utility B possesses no storage
and has no market for increased power. In these circumstances utility B
would have to spill water. Utility B's spillage represents a loss of energy
production for the aggregate system. If utilities A and B had cooperated,
a smaller amount of water could have been released and the amount of
energy needed to meet A's additional load could have been produced by
the combined utilities.
The logic for two utilities extends to an entire river system; maximizing
hydropower production from a given quantity of water requires the coordinated operation of all upriver storage and downstream dams. On the
Columbia over 50 projects must be coordinated.7 ' Moreover, there are
other interdependencies involved in hydropower production. For example, energy generated is a product of head (height of water fall) and the
volume of water. Therefore, when pool elevation is lowered by releasing
storage, energy production at a project is reduced. Maximizing total
system electricity production requires incorporation of this effect into the
sequencing of storage drawdown.
Another example of interdependencies occurs because hydropower production is only one source of electrical energy. Reduced aggregate cost
can be obtained by choosing the least cost combination of generating
resources for each time period, regardless of ownership.72 A final example
is that of economies of size in electricity generation for meeting peak
loads (periods of maximum energy demand) and for reliability (backup
for down equipment). Linking utilities which have different patterns of
peak loads (called peak load diversity in the energy industry) allows
utilities to borrow each other's resources during their respective peak
loads, thereby reducing the total capacity required. Similarly, less capacity
71. Draft Role EIS, supra note 5; Wandschneider, supra note 7, at table 1.
72. Wandschneider, supra note 7, at 26. The major non-hydropower generating resources in the
Pacific Northwest are coal, nuclear, and gas/oil turbine thermal generators.
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is required as reserve when utilities may rely partially on each other in
the event of breakdown or other loss of power.
These arguments suggest that, if least cost energy production is the
goal, a region's hydropower system and electrical generating industry
should be operated as one giant utility, but, in fact, Columbia River
hydropower projects are owned and operated by numerous private and
public utlities. 73 Columbia River hydropower and Northwest regional
electricity production, however, are managed for many purposes as if
there were a single regional utility. The earlier description related how
the utilities cooperate to produce and follow an integrated annual operating
program. Regional management is mediated by a number of contractual
agreements, voluntary associations, informal agreements, coordinating
committees and even an international treaty.74 Thus, the example of Columbia River hydropower generation reveals that a set of negotiated agreements is able to achieve internationalization of externalities and economies
of scale to maximize power production.
While the Columbia River hydropower generation example seems to
contradict the thesis that river basins require central managers, it supports
the arguments of a number of public choice and property rights political
economists. These scholars argue that negotiation, voluntary agreement
and contract can enable decentralized management to achieve the efficiencies, perhaps exceed the efficiencies, of central management in the
public provision/market failure context.75 The public choice-property fights
approach to institutional organization comprises a number of related positive and normative propositions rather than a single coherent body.76 A
sample of these propositions is quickly summarized below.
a. Provided non-attenuated rights structures can be specified, ef73. Ownership is distributed among BPA managed Federal Columbia River Power System (Corps
and USBR dams) and some 15 other generating utilities. Id. at 23-27 and figure 6. Regionally there
are well over 100 utilities. BPA's customer list, which incudes most of the utilities, number 125
customers. BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION, 1982 ANNUAL REPORT (February 1983)
(DOE/BPA-152).
74. Two key documents are: Treaty Relating to Cooperative Development of the Water Resources
of the Columbia River Basin, Jan. 17, 1961, United States-Canada, 15 U.S.T. 1555, T.I.A.S. No.
5638, 542 U.N.T.S. 244; Agreement for Coordination of Operations Among Power Systems of the
Pacific Northwest, BPA Contract No. 14-03-48221, Sept. 1964 (available from BPA, Box 3621,
Portland, OR 97208). In addition to those, other agreements include memoranda of agreement
between federal agencies (BPA-Corps, BPA-USBR) and such coordinating organizations as the
Northwest Power Pool (NPP), the Pubic Power Council, the "Coordinating Group" (an engineering
committee of NPP), and the Intercompany Pool. See generally, Draft Role EIS, supra note 5;
Wandschneider, supra note 7.
75. Whether or not efficiency is the appropriate or only indicator of performance is another
question. See infra text accompanying notes 118-143.
76. For a sample collection of writing of this school, see THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY
RIGHTS (Furubotn & Pejovich eds. 1974).
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ficient allocation of resources can be achieved in the face of externalities through negotiation and voluntary agreement.'
b. Private enterprises are more efficient than public enterprises.
Efficient team production can be gained in an organization with an
owner who monitors the other workers and has rights to the residual
(i.e., profit) and to sell the firm.7" Bureaucracies maximize budgets,
not profits, leading to inefficient overproduction."'
c. Separation of governmental organizations into a number of
production and consumer-co-op units promotes efficiency. The existence of a number of small units, each with a tax-service package
allows the individual to choose his preferred bundle.° The separation
of producing and consuming units allows for economies of size in
production while retaining small units for consumption as noted
above. 8 Moreover, competition between "producers" for the trade
of the consumers promotes efficiency in contrast to the monopolistic
inefficiencies of the standard "vertically integrated" government.8 2
Also, a "fiscal federalism" of multiple levels of government allows
services to be provided by the lowest level of government compatible
with externality internalization attainment of economies of size or
matching indivisibilities. 83
This body of public choice-property rights theory in support of pluralistic institutional forms (henceforth labeled policentric political economy) provides an explanation and rationale for many of the institutional
features of Columbia River management. The arrangements for collaborative operation of the hydropower system described earlier exemplify
the negotiation approach to the internalization of externalities. They also
demonstrate the separation of units into large producing (generating) and
smaller consuming units to attain economies of size and incorporate indivisibilities. Large-scale enterprises84 build the major projects. Small,
local utilities (mostly public utilities) specialize in local electricity distribution and energy retailing.8" While hydropower presents the clearest
case of policentric organization, the entire Columbia River management
77. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. ECON. 1 (1960); Cheung, The Structure of a
Contractand the Theory of a Non-Exclusive Resource, 13 J.L. ECON. 49 (1970).
78. Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM.

ECON. REV. 777 (1972).
79. W. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971).
80. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
81. Olson, The Principleof "FiscalEquivalence":The Division ofResponsibilityAmongDifferent
Levels of Government, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 479 (1969).

82. R. BISH, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF METROPOLITAN AREAS (1971).
83. Olson, supra note 81.
84. The USBR, the Corps, large public and private utilities and joint ventures, build major
generating facilities. BPA builds and operates the transmission grid. See generally Lee, supra note
7.
85. Id. See also supra note 73.
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structure is replete with voluntary associations, coordinating councils,
arrangements connecting various components of the sysand contractual
86
tem.
The major effort in the first part of this article has been to establish,
by theory and case study, the case for a decentralized river management
scheme. The assumption has been that the case for centralization of river
system management is so compelling .that the decentralization argument
must be presented in greater detail. The logic of policentric political
economy and the example of Columbia River management demonstrate
that a decentralized scheme for river basin management is not only possible, but potentially desirable. A single case study proves the possibility,
but not the superiority. The argument for centralization based on the logic
of market failure and public admihistration still suggests possible flaws
in decentralized management. The investigation will now turn to a critical
examination of how a decentralized management system performs when
confronted with some specific institutional tasks: externalities and conflict
resolution.
PROBLEMS IN DECENTRALIZED RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT SCHEMES
Externalities
There is ample reason to be skeptical of the negotiation approach to
externalities. 87 In this section three specific circumstances in which externalities arise in Columbia River management are examined critically.
These three situations are: (1) the issue of the benefit of upstream storage
for downstream electrical production; (2) the competition between hydropower and fishery habitat; and (3) the competition between irrigation
and hydropower production.
First, consider the case of positive externalities generated by construc86. E.g., the Columbia River Water Management Group (CRWMG) (a coordinating committee
for federal water agencies concerned with multiple use management of the system); the Committee
on Fishery Operations (COFO) (a subcommittee of the CRWMG which deals with the integration
of fishery needs into other operational decisions); Memoranda of Agreements between BPA and the
USBR and Corps which specify the manner in which they coordinate water operations; the Columbia
Basin Fish and Wildlife Council (brings together state, federal and Indian fishery agencies); the
Columbia River Inter Tribal Fish Council (provides joint research and a common policy forum for
major tribes). See generally Draft Role EIS, supra note 5; and supra note 7.
87. There is a sizeable literature on the validity of the Coase theorem and therefore on the theoretic
status of the negotiation solution to externalities. E.g., Dick, The Voluntary Approach to Externality
Problems:A Survey of Critics, 2 J. ENVTL. ECON. MGMT. 185 (1976). See also Coase Theorem
Symposium-Part 1, 13 NAT. RES. J. 557 (1973). The Coase theorem asserts that externalities can
be resolved optimally by negotiation if property rights are non-attenuated and that such an optimal
allocation will be the same regardless of whether A or B is assigned the right. The literature reveals
that allocations will in fact be different (albeit they may be efficient) if there are transaction costs,
income effects, non-separability, long-run adjustments, or threats.
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tion of upstream storage. If utility A builds a storage reservoir to hold
water from the spring runoff for release during the peak electrical demand
period of winter, all projects located below the storage point will benefit
from the "reshaped" streamflow. Therefore, the planning of new storage
should take into account the whole system of downstream storage, not
just those owned by the reservoir builder.88 A builder who fails to consider
the downstream benefits of his storage will produce less storage than is
efficient.8 9
Experience in storage planning has been mixed. An extensive study
found that two dams built by a private utility in Idaho were not as efficient
in providing storage as a plan proposed by the federal government.'
Likewise, five mid-Columbia dams built by non-federal public utilities
were constructed as run of river dams, whereas the Corps of Engineers
had envisioned some two million acre-feet of storage9
These two examples demonstrate that a "fragmented" approach to river
management produced less energy than a unitary approach under a federal
agency. It is important to note, however, that mechanisms have been used
to attempt to bring storage in line with an efficient, systemwide plan.
The dominant approach has been that of provision by large public agencies
(the Corps and the Bureau of Reclamation). They built and presently
operate most U.S. Columbia River storage. 92 The largest single block of
storage, however, has been the outcome of a complicated sequence of
events involving negotiation and merger. The developer was the British
Columbia provincial utility.93 The downstream utilities in combination
with other utilities negotiated an agreement to combine and purchase the
power generated by the Canadian storage.9 4 This is a classic example of
one recommended policentric approach: a large-scale producer with many
smaller purchasers.95 Both issues of externality and indivisibility were
thereby addressed within a pluralistic system although the pluralism is
compromised by the presence of these very large agents.
In the case of the private dam on the Snake River in Idaho, the reg88. Once built, the system must be operated in a coordinated fashion to realize maximum benefits
from this infrastructure. See supra text accompanying notes 67-71. Note also that other purposes
for storage construction, e.g., flood control, are not being discussed.
89. Downstream benefits may often be significantly larger than the benefits at the project site.
90. J. V. KRUTILLA & 0. ECKSTEIN, MULTIPLE PURPOSE RIVER DEVELOPMENT 136169 (1958).
91. Id. at 140.
92. See generally supra note 7.
93. See generally N. SWAINSON, CONFLICT OVER THE COLUMBIA: THE CANADIAN
BACKGROUND TO AN HISTORIC TREATY (1979); J. KRUTILLA, THE COLUMBIA RIVER
TREATY (1967); and Blumm, supra note 70.
94. Supra note 93.
95. Supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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ulatory approach was used.96 The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
licenses hydropower projects on navigable streams. As a condition for
its license, the private utility was required to increase storage.97
In summary, the case of provision of storage shows that negotiation
is, in fact, used as a remedy to externalities. The rights negotiation method
is, however, only one of the approaches used. The regulatory, merger,
and public provision approaches were also used. While there is no way
to know, the evidence of the Snake River9" and mid-Columbia99 examples
indicates that the overall quantity of storage on the Columbia River is
inefficiently small compared to what would have been provided by a
single water development agency.
Consider now the case of the use of streamflow for fishery habitat
versus other uses, especially hydropower. Fishery use conflicts with other
uses in a number of ways. Dam construction for navigation, hydropower
and flood control seriously degrades the anadromous fishery habitat. We
focus, however, on the specific case of streamflow regulation. As noted
earlier, hydropower operators store water from spring runoff for use in
the winter. The spring runoff is also important, however, to downstream
migration of juvenile anadromous fish."o Their migration survival is impaired by reduced spring flows. Until 1975 this fishery use of streamflow
was ignored entirely by the agencies regulating Columbia River streamflow.'"' Fishery interests had virtually no standing in the negotiations
which determined streamflows. 0 2 Therefore, an externality existed; the
impact of hydropower management on the fishery was not accounted for
either through compensation or changes in operations.
A significant difference between the hydropower storage and the fishery
case is that the fishery is a non-exclusive and fugitive resource. The logic
of the negotiation remedy requires the non-right holder to bid for services
from the rights holder. If the bid is insufficient, present allocation is
defined as efficient. 0 3 In the case of storage, downstream dam owners
could propose to compensate Canada, for example, for the provision of
storage benefits. These benefits could be identified and distributed to the
group's members. In the case of the fishery, neither an individual actor
nor a group is likely to come forward to buy streamflow from the power
operators who currently hold the rights, even if it were in their collective
interests to do so. Because the fishery is a non-exclusive resource, a
96. See KRUTILLA & ECKSTEIN, supra note 90.
97. Id.
98. Supra note 90 and accompanying text.
99. Supra note 91 and accompanying text.
100. Supra notes 51 and 52 and accompanying text.
101. See generally Blumm, supra note 70.
102. Id.
103. Randall, supra note 61, at 141.
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potential purchaser could not capture the benefits of the changed river
flow: non-purchasers also have access to the benefits (increased fish). The
key point here is that the non-exclusiveness of the resource impedes
cooperative action by the fishery interests. It is in each agent's individual
interest to let the other guy do it." Alternatively stated, the individual
incentive pattern of the fishery creates high transaction costs thereby
impeding the formation of collective action.
Recently a new law has been implemented giving fishing interests
property rights in a certain volume of spring river flow: the water budget
of the Fish and Wildlife Program under the Power Planning Act."0 5 The
rights are assigned to a collective body representing various fishery interests. The creation of these rights and their assignment to a collective
entity cuts through the transaction costs/incentive structure problem of
the fishery. The point is that the non-exclusive and fugitive nature of the
fishery implies an asymmetric negotiation and payoff structure. Where
fishery interests must cooperate to collectively bid for the use of another
party's streamflow rights (hydropower operators), the incentive-negotiation structure is such that their interests are not represented. Where the
fishery agents are awarded the primary right, their interests are very clearly
represented. "06
The third externality case is that of the irrigation-hydropower conflict.
Water diverted for consumptive uses, such as irrigation, is unavailable
for instream uses, such as hydropower production. Under Western appropriation water law,"' instream users often have no rights even in water
they are currently using. 0 8 Thus, decisions to divert water are made
without regard to the impacts on present or future instream uses.
In earlier days the*huge flow of the Columbia River was not totally
harnessed by hydropower." 9 Therefore, water diverted by irrigators was
not a significant loss to hydropower (except, perhaps in the lowest flow
periods). As demand for electricity increased, facilities were expanded
to harness almost the entire Columbia stream flow."' Moreover, hydropower had to be supplemented by expensive thermal (steam) production.
104. M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (2d ed. 1971); Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124 (1954).
105. Supra notes 1, 51, & 52 and accompanying text.
106. Randall, supra note 61, at 140, points out that the higher the transaction costs, the more
disparate allocations and distributions will be under rights assignment favoring A or B.
107. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
108. Idaho, Washington and Oregon recognize and issue some rights for hydropower, but none
for other instrean uses. Fishery and water quality are only protected by collective rights: minimum
flows. Even rights for hydropower are usually subordinated to future irrigation, see infra note 115.
109. See generally Butcher, Wandschneider & Whittlesey, Competition Between Irrigation and
Hydropower in the PacificNorthwest (available from P. Wandschneider, Department of Agricultural
Economics, Washington State University, Pullman, WA 99164-6210).
110. Id. See also Lee, supra note 7.
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The opportunity cost of losses to irrigation now entails the production of
replacement energy from thermal sources.,'
Although the marginal value of water for hydropower production exceeds its value for irrigated agriculture, the institutional structure does
not bring these costs to bear on present or potential irrigators. An externality exists. No negotiations emerge to reallocate water from irrigated
agriculture to hydropower. In fact, irrigation expansion is not inhibited
by the cost it imposes on electricity users since irrigators pay nothing for
their water. (They do pay pumping and associated access costs.) Irrigation
expansion is being slowed in the region only by the direct impacts of low
product prices on revenues and high energy costs on pumping costs. Only
on the Snake River in Idaho have hydropower water rights been upheld
against irrigation. " Elsewhere some collective measures have been taken
to protect hydropower and other instream uses via minimum flows." 3
The general failure of a negotiated reallocation to emerge in this case
can be partly attributed to attenuated rights and partly to asymmetric
qualities of the commodities. Water rights are attenuated in the sense that
they are not freely transferable,"' and instream uses are often simply not
recognized under appropriation water law." 5 Besides their different legal
standing, instream uses and diversionary uses have asymmetric characteristics. Users who divert water capture the value directly. Instream users
can-capture the value, but the value accrues in non-exclusive, joint supply
to all downstream entities. This joint supply aspect means that, unless
they collectively purchase the water rights, hydropower producers will
under-invest in purchasing water rights. 1 6 In short, hydropower is to
irrigation as fishery is to hydropower. The transactions costs for hydropower interests to cooperate for a collective bid are large, albeit not so
large as those of the fishery.
I 11. Whittlesey, Buteau, Butcher & Walker, Energy Tradeoffs and Economic Feasibility of Irrigation Development in the Pacific Northwest (1981) (College of Agriculture Research Center
Bulletin 0896, Washington State University).
112. Idaho Power Co. v. State, 104 Idaho 575, 661 P.2d 741 (1983). Rights dating from 19061930 were determined not to be subordinated. In the absence of any explicit subordination language,
hydropower flow rights were declared legally equivalent to diversionary rights in Idaho.
113. See, e.g., WASH. ADMIN. CODE R. ch. 173-563 (1982). See also Blumm, supra note 7,
at 262-300.
114. Among the frequently found obstacles to water transfers are the requirement for water agency
approvals for changes in use on point of diversion (in order to protect third parties) and the beneficial
use doctrine that water is limited to the quantity which can be reasonably applied. Thus transferral
of water may be evidence that the original appropriation exceeded need, was therefore surplus, and
hence is forfeit. See, e.g., Williams, The Requirement of Beneficial Use as a Cause of Waste in
Water Resource Development 23 NAT. RES. J. 7 (1983); and LeVeen & Stavins, Institutional
Impediments for More Efficient Use and Allocation of Irrigation Water in the West (September 1981)
(Report prepared for the Rural American Task Force, the Ford Foundation).
115. Appropriation water law usually requires an actual diversion and application to a beneficial
use for a valid appropriation. E.g., I HUTCHINS, supra note 11, at 366.
116. OLSON, supra note 104.
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In conclusion, the examples cited show that negotiations do not automatically emerge to provide remedies for externalities. In particular,
where transactions costs are high or the commodity has a "market failure"
type characteristic such as non-exclusiveness, the result can often be quite
different than what might have been expected under a scheme of central
resource management." 7 Storage is "under produced," fisheries "under
protected," and irrigation "over expanded," because some affected parties
continue to be excluded from the negotiation process by which the externality situation is managed.
Conflict Resolution in PolicentricSystems
In the discussion of externality management, negotiation is presented
as a mechanism for allocating resources. More about the negotiation
process can be learned by viewing it as a public choice rule: a mechanism
for deciding between alternatives, in this case alternative resource allocation regimes. Viewing negotiation in this light takes the emphasis off
the efficiency criterion and focuses on a criterion of accountability. In
this section the focus switches from allocation to public choice; from
efficiency to accountability.
In the policentric, pluralistic system described for the Columbia River
decisions are reached when consensus emerges. All parties who have
rights must voluntarily agree to the proposed decision." 8 The implicit
public choice rule is unanimity. In this section the consequences of adopting a de facto unanimity public choice rule for river system management
will be discussed.
To understand the unanimity rule, it should be compared to the alternative public choice rules which would apply under a centralized administrative scheme. A number of public choice rules are consistent with
central administration, including dictatorship. Given the United States
political environment, the assumption of some more democratic form of
centralism is appropriate. Actual political rules tend to be complex. For
example, the Tennessee Valley Authority is managed by a board appointed
by the President, and it operates under policies established by Congress. , 9
This is a multiple stage process in which the citizen-voters elect representatives (Congress and the President), who establish general policies
and appoint the direct managers. At the heart of this process of repre117. See Randall, supra note 61.
118. Decisions are made and enacted either through agreements (voluntary and contractual) or,
occasionally, through state or federal legislation. See generallysupra note 7 and accompanying text.
Where new law is created, it usually is the result of negotiations among the regional interest groups.
On the antecedents of the Northwest Power Planning Act, see Lee, supra note 7, ch. 4; and
Hemmingway, The Northwest PowerPlanningCouncil: Its Originand FutureRole, 13 ENVTL. L.
673 (1983).
119. Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, 16 U.S.C. § 831 (1982).
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sentative democracy is the election of decisionmakers by majority rule.
In summary, the alternative to negotiation-unanimity is democratic centralism embodying majority rule and representation.
The unanimity rule is characterized by high decision costs, a tendency
to stalemate in the event of fundamental conflict, and non-neutrality
towards different alternatives. 20 The focus here is on non-neutrality. The
unanimity rule gives each recognized participant a veto. This allows each
participant to protect himself from changes perceived to be harmful. The
ability of each recognized participant to block change is the essence of
the non-neutrality feature of the unanimity public choice rule. Given two
alternatives, one of which is the status quo, the status quo wins as long
as one party prefers it and therefore vetoes change."'2 Awarding each
member a veto appears to treat all parties equally but really protects those
who have the largest stake in the status quo. Those who have few or no
rights in the status quo will not have their preferences heard.
The case of the fishery-hydropower conflict over stream flow management illustrates this point. Until recently, fishery interests had few rights
in the management of Columbia River stream flows.' 22 Federal projects
were authorized for multiple purposes including fisheries, and FERC
'
licenses required recognition of fish interests in setting minimum flows. 23
But for the most part, obligations to fisheries were discharged by construction of fish ladders which provide passage around dams for upstream
migration and hatcheries to replace lost natural propagation. 24 Streamflow
was managed to maximize hydropower." 2
The 1960s and 1970s spawned the environmental movement; preferences among the general public shifted away from energy production and
economic growth, and toward environment values. Hydropower interests
continued, however, to control Columbia River streamflow.' 26 Utilities
continued to negotiate among themselves to jointly produce the maximum
electricity as closely as possible. Only when rights began to change were
fishery interests included. In the middle and late 1970s a series of decisions
120. D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE (1979); J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCH, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); A. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE
(1970).
121. E.g., MUELLER, supra note 120, ch. 11. In contrast, majority rule is neutral between
alternatives; whichever alternative captures a majority of votes wins.
122. See generally Blumm, supra note 7. See also discussion suprd notes 100-102 and accompanying text.
123. Blumm, supra note 7.
124. Id. at 214-222.
125. See description supra, at pp. 9-12. See also Id.
126. See generally Blumm, supra note 7.
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in federal district courts reaffirmed Indian rights to the salmon fishery. 27
While the issue is not entirely resolved, these rights include some habitat
rights.'28 The Northwest Power Planning Act also greatly increased the
relative rights of the fishery. 2 9 The Act requires federal agencies to work
to mitigate the harmful effects of hydropower development on the fishery.
As noted earlier, this right has recently been made concrete by the creation

of a fishery water management agency with explicit rights to control a
volume of spring runoff. 3 '
In summary, the unanimity public choice rule gave weight to the interests of the utilities who owned and operated the projects. Fishery
interests were ignored because under the status quo they had no rights.
Only when the underlying structure of rights was changed by the courts
and Congress were fishery interests taken into account.
Another Northwest issue illustrates the tendency for stalemate to occur
in a negotiated-unanimity decision structure. The issue is access to federally produced hydropower. Marketing of federally produced hydropower (by the BPA) is constrained by a provision called the "preference
clause," inserted into much federal energy legislation.' 3 ' The preference
clause gives priority access to public utilities (co-ops, municipals and

public utility districts) over investor owned utilities (IOUs). For a long
time federally produced hydropower was so abundant that the preference

clause was not relevant.' 32 In fact, BPA was looking for markets for its
power.'33 Power was sold to IOUs and to large electroprocessing companies. 34 When demand began to expand faster than the capacity of the
127. Principal cases include United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974)
(Final Decision 1), afd Washington v. Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979) (Indian
fishermen have right to half harvestable fish run); Kittitas Reclamation Dist. v. Sunnyside Valley
Irrigation Dist., 626 F.2d 95 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1079 (1981) (Irrigation storage
must be released to protect fish spawning grounds); and United States v. Washington, 506 F. Supp.
187 (W.D. Wash. 1980), aff'd in partand rev'd in part, 694 F.2d 1374 (9th Circ. 1982). See also,
Note, United States v. Washington (Phase 11): The Indian Fishing Conflict Moves Upstream, 12
ENVTL. L. 469 (1982).
128. United States v. Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187 (W.D. Wash. 1980), affd in part and rev'd
in part, 694 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1982). Judge Orrick ruled that Indian treaty fishing rights entitled
them to a protected fishery environment otherwise it might be an empty right. A Ninth Circuit panel
later reversed the district court's findings regarding fishery habitat. Most recently the full Ninth
Circuit has withdrawn the panel's decision and will hear the case en banc, 704 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir.
1983). Eventual appeal to the Supreme Court is likely.
129. 16 U.S.C. §829 (1982). See, Blumm & Johnson, supra note 36; Sanders, The Northwest
Power Act and Reserved Tribal Rights, 58 WASH. L. REV. 357 (1983).
130. Supra notes 51 & 52 and accompanying text.
131. E.g., 16 U.S.C. § 832(c)(a) (1976). See, e.g., Redman, Preference and Other Clauses in
Federal Marketing Acts, 13 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 773 (1983).
132. Lee, supra note 7. See also NORWOOD, supra note 70; and Blumm, supra note 70.
133. See supra note 132.
134. Id.
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federal Columbia River Power System, the preference clause came into
effect. Rather than market power to the highest bidder, BPA was compelled to ration power, notifying its non-preference customers that their
access would be curtailed.' 35 As the investor-owned utilities turned to
more expensive thermal sources to supply electricity, a disparity in rates
emerged between customers of public and private utilities.136 The preference clause gave public utilities a property right to a resource (federally
produced hydropower) that was fixed in quantity. The case was one of
pure conflict (zero sum)-how should a fixed quantity of cheap energy
be distributed.' 3 7 Current rights holders vetoed any suggestion that they
give up their rights.' 38 Regional debate became extensive and bitter.'39
Tension increased, but no departure from the status quo was possible.
The normal avenues of negotiation provide no release for tensions in
these cases of conflict over how the pie is to be divided. Negotiation
presumes some potential mutual benefit. A negotiation-unanimity decision
framework succeeds only if one party agrees to give up a right (altruism)
or if other parties can bring the issue into a wider arena and provide
offsetting benefits to the potential losing party from this wider arena.
In the preference clause case the issue was resolved by a combination
of widening the agenda and appealing to a higher authority (Congress)
to redefine the primary rights structure. The issue of access to federal
power was one of the major issues leading to enactment of the Northwest
Power Planning Act. "4The method of resolution was to grant the domestic
and rural consumers of investor-owned utilities the status of preference
customers while guaranteeing previous preference customers the right to
electricity rates no higher than they would have been without the Act.' 4
The new preference customers are instead subsidized by increased rates
to a third party-the large electroprocessing industrial customers who are
BPA's direct customers. 42
' These industrial customers were willing to pay
this price to retain access to electricity. In effect they pay much of the
increased cost of thermal power.'43
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Note that if BPA had the right to sell the power at whatever the market would bear, BPA
would have been able to capture the benefits, and both IOUs and public utilities would have had to
pay the prices. BPA, however, is required to sell its product at low cost (cost of production), not
at market prices. 16 U.S.C. § 832 (1982).
138. Lee, supra note 7, ch. 4.
139. Id.
140. Id. at ch. 5.
141. 16 U.S.C. § 839c (1982).
142. Id. See also Finklan, Bonneville Power Administration Ratemaking, 13 ENVTL. L. REP.
(ENVTL. L. INST.) 929 (1983).
143. See, e.g., BonnevilleAnnouncesProposedRateIncrease, I NORTHWEST ENERGY NEWS
13 (December 1982).
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In summary, in the face of changing circumstances, a unanimity-negotiation framework can do nothing but implement current property rights
and allow tensions to rise. The stalemate must be broken by going outside
the framework. Either primary rights must be rearranged by a higher or
more powerful authority or the scope of negotiation must be increased.
In this example and in many practical cases the approach used is a
composite.'" The major thesis of the section is that the negotiationunanimity framework is geared to allow for changes within the scope of
the existing distribution of costs and benefits. As long as that basic distribution is accepted ethically and politically, the framework works normatively and practically. When conditions (technology, preferences,
perceptions) change such that underlying conflict surfaces, the negotiation-unanimity framework cannot defuse the situation.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This article explored some positive and normative qualities of the
decentralized-negotiated approach to river management. It first addressed
the question of whether decentralized management of such an interdependent physical system is possible. By theory and the example of the
Columbia River management structure a decentralized management approach was proved viable. In the Columbia River case, however, solving
problems of interdependence (e.g., the storage issue) often required some
application of such centralizing approaches as merging of firms, public
provision, or government regulation.
The article next addressed the consequences of employing a decentralized-negotiated management approach for questions of externalities
and conflict resolution. In the case of externalities, negotiated solutions
may not emerge especially when situations exhibit market failure type
characteristics. The consequence is that some costs may be ignored and
inefficiency persist. The consequence of adopting the decentralized-negotiated framework for conflict resolution stems from the unanimity public
choice process implicit in negotiation. Unanimity allows changes that
benefit all but blocks change that would harm any existing rights holder.
Decentralized-negotiated management structures protect those who benefit from the current rights structure but let harm befall those without
rights. In contrast majority rule gives the right to one group to impose
change on a minority and confiscate property. 4 5
In conclusion, the evidence presented in this case study suggests that
144. For instance, in the access to federal hydropower case, participants appealed to Congress
to change the law (the Northwest Power Planning Act) and third parties (the industrial customers)
were brought into an expanded negotiation framework.
145. See supra note 121.
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no general recommendations for decentralized or centralized river basin
management structures are justified. Such general recommendations are
not justifiable for two reasons. First, one cannot say ex ante that either
more centralized or more decentralized systems will be more efficient. 46
'
The Columbia River example illustrates inefficiencies in the decentralized
approach. Given the costs and inefficiencies of bureaucracies, it is likely
that a centralized administrative approach will also have its failures."
Yet each approach can muster arguments in its favor. 48 With the physical
complexities of river systems, the complex character of institutions, and
the contradictory arguments for centralized versus decentralized management, there is simply no clear judgment either way.
The second fundamental problem blocking a general recommendation
of organizational form is that choosing institutional form not only alters
what is efficient and what is not, it also alters who wins and who loses.
When one chooses between decentralized-negotiated management structures and more centralized but democratic institutions, one implicitly
chooses between unanimity and majority rules. One is therefore choosing
to either confirm the rights of the current (status quo) rights holder to
block change (unanimity), or one gives the right to a majority to impose
change on a minority and thereby to confiscate property.
In summary, the choice of institutional forms cannot be reduced to a
few relatively simple rules. After very careful study of the potential
consequences the choice must be made. The economist contributes to the
understanding of potential consequences. The ultimate choice is ethical
and political.

146. The problem is further compounded because efficiency is a relative concept, conditional on
the underlying distribution. See, e.g., Randall, supranote 61, at 139-40. What appears to be efficient
from one perspective, may be inefficient from another. It depends on what effects are included as
costs, and at what price. In many cases of economic analysis the institutional (property rights)
structure can be taken as given. But the task of institutional design is precisely to specify the property
rights which will form the basis for determining what is efficient.
147. See, e.g., Demsetz, supra note 66.
148. See supra notes 63-65 & 76-83 and accompanying text.

